Seminario del Dpto. de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la ciencia (UNED)
VIERNES 19 DE JUNIO, 12.00 (Sala de Grados de Filosofía, UNED)
Xavier de Donato Rodríguez (U. Santiago de Compostela): "Desacuerdo genuino"
A popular view among philosophers is that genuine disagreement is achieved whenever A and B express contradictory or directly inconsistent referential propositions or states of affairs. The view that this kind of disagreement (let us call it ‘referential disagreement’) is all there is to genuine disagreement constitutes a firm consensus in the philosophy of language and the theory of attitude reports. This talk aims to show that, albeit its initial plausibility and motivation, this view is wrong. Other candidates will be examined in the light of ordinary examples (intensional and comprehensive disagreement, which respectively involve contradictory intensions and understandings). If intensions are highly variable from subject to subject and maybe for subjects at different times, it remains mysterious how disagreement, and indeed communication, can ever get off the ground. Scientific controversies will be taken as a further case study. This will help to show the exact ways in which referential, intensional and comprehensive disagreement relate to one another.